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SUMMARY
The article presents the attitude of Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro – a key statesman and political 
writer in the 17th-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – toward the principle of necessitas 
frangit legem. At the beginning, the intellectual sources of his understanding of this principle are 
discussed. Two groups are referenced: one referring to the Christian legal view on necessitas and 
the other connected with the question of the reason of state. Then four aspects of Fredro’s thought 
and political activity are analyzed. Firstly, his reference to necessitas treated as the justification of 
the amendment of the old law. Secondly, various examples of his flexible attitude toward law. All of 
them express Fredro’s opinion on the key role of prudence in the process of applying law. Thirdly, the 
question of the infringement of law is discussed by referring to his concept of the exception from law 
and his reaction to Siciński’s veto. Fourthly, it is pointed how in the context of the political conflict 
during the 1660s Fredro adopted a much stricter attitude toward observing the law. In the end, the 
conclusions state that Fredro’s case is a good example of the dilemma of Polish political thought and 
practice of how to combine effective governance with the respect for constitutional forms.
Keywords: Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; necessitas frangit 
legem; law






Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro’s approach toward the legal question, which 
constitutes an important area of his theoretical reflection and public activity, is 
detected by analyzing both his text as well as his political choices1. This article 
discusses Fredro’s attitude toward the popular in the 17th-century Europe principle 
necessitas frangit legem2.
Trying to detect the sources that shaped the way of understanding the principle 
necessitas frangit legem and which most likely influenced Fredro, we could point to 
two groups: the first one is connected with the Christian reflection on law while the 
second one is related to the broad tradition of the reason of the state. In the literature 
on these topics, the origin of the discussed principle is connected with canon law, 
where in Gratian’s Decretum was expressed in the form of legal maxim necessitas 
legem non habet3. It served to justify the departure from the pattern of behaviour 
complied with legal norm in the name of saving higher good. This approach was 
similar in meaning to the exception of the state of necessity. As Decretum was still 
in force as a part of Corpus Iuris Canonici this understanding of necessitas was 
still relevant and significant in Fredro’s time.
We could take as quite probable the influence of St. Thomas Aquinas whose 
interpretation of Aristotle was dominant at the University in Kraków during An-
drzej Maksymilian’s studies4. Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae, in question 96, 
Article 6 discusses the problem: “Whether he who is under a law may act beside 
the letter of the law?”5. He claims that such behaviour is needed in the situation 
(casus), when the result of the action in accordance with the letter of the law 
would harm the common good, which constitutes the aim of the law. Although 
in the case that a person does not observe a letter of law, he or she follows the 
intention of the lawgiver (intentione legislatoris). Aquinas indicates that what 
must be taken into account is “the motive of the lawgiver (causam quae movit 
legislatorem), rather than of his very words”6. The assessment of what constitutes 
the good of a given community, and thus the decision to dispense from the letter 
1 The overall analysis of Fredro’s political and legal thought is presented in the monograph: 
M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Republika versus monarchia. Myśl polityczna i prawna Andrzeja Maksymiliana 
Fredry, Łódź 2019. This article constitutes partially a supplement to the previous researches.
2 See European Political Thought 1450–1700: Religion, Law and Philosophy, eds. H.A. Lloyd, 
G. Burgess, S. Hodson, New Heaven – London 2007, pp. 130, 224, 393–393, 448, 507.
3 See G. Agamben, State of Exception, Chicago 2008, pp. 24–25; J. Syryjczyk, Stan wyższej 
konieczności w prawie karnym kanonicznym, „Prawo Kanoniczne” 1982, no. 1–2, p. 282; W. Ostro-
żyński, Prawo wyższej konieczności, Lwów 1886, pp. 9–11.
4 See Z. Ogonowski, Filozofia szkolna w Polsce XVII wieku, Warszawa 1985, pp. 27–29.
5 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. First Part of the Second Part, bilingual Latin and 
English edition, https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I-II.Q96.A5.Rep3 [access: 1.12.2020].
6 Ibidem.
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of law belongs to those who are in authority. But here St. Thomas provides for the 
following exception: “If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the 
delay involved by referring the matter to authority, the mere necessity brings with 
it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law (necessitas non subditur legi)”7. 
Necessitas therefore justifies the behaviour which on the one hand differs from 
the action demanded by the letter of the law, but on the other hand, results from 
the assessment of a given case and the recognition of what is a common good in 
these circumstances. Additionally, we could note that St. Paul also contrasts the 
letter and the Spirit of the law: “Who has indeed qualified us as ministers of a new 
covenant, not of letter but of spirit; for the letter brings death, but the Spirit gives 
life”8. As the influence of the Bible on Fredro’s thought was predominant, the 
above-mentioned quote probably enables us to understand his generally negative 
approach to the letter of law.
The variety of concepts of the reason of the state was connected by referencing 
them to necessitas9. Although the notion of the reason of state was most com-
pletely discussed then by G. Botero, the important incentive for the development 
of this tradition, popular in the 16th and 17th centuries, was given by N. Machia-
velli’s works. In the context of the principle necessitas frangit legem we should 
note the Florentine’s analysis concerning the Roman institution of dictatorship in 
Book I Chapter XXXIV of his Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius10. 
He is of the opinion that this institution is needed in a free government in case of 
urgent necessities. Otherwise: “For when a similar method is lacking in a Republic, 
either observing the institutions [strictly] will ruin her, or in order not to ruin her, 
it will be necessary to break them”11. Both of these consequences are assessed 
negatively by Machiavelli. Breaking the law is an extraordinary remedy that, 
while temporarily necessary, in the long-term sets a bad example for the citizens 
by accustoming them to disobeying the law. The Florentine concludes: “So that no 
Republic will be perfect, unless it has provided for everything with laws, and pro-
vided a remedy for every incident, and fixed the method of governing it”12. Thus, 
he proposes to introduce into a republican system the solutions, which, although 
contradictory to its core principles, will enable it to avoid breaking the law in an 
7 Ibidem.
8 2 Corinthians, 3, 6, https://bible.usccb.org/bible/2corinthians/3 [access: 30.11.2020].
9 See C. Zeron, Political Theories and Jesuit Politics, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of the Jesuits, 
ed. I.G. Županov, New York 2019, pp. 200–201.
10 See the analysis of this part in: K. Prokop, Modele stanu nadzwyczajnego, Białystok 2012, 
pp. 65–68.









emergency. However, we have no convincing evidence that Fredro had known 
this concept13.
There is no doubt that Andrzej Maksymilian encountered the maxim Necessitas 
omnem legem frangit in Lipsius’ Politicorum, which he frequently recommended 
and quoted both in Latin and probably also in P. Szczerbic’s Polish translation. 
The whole paragraph with the discussed quote reads as follow: Necessitas mag-
num imbecillitatis humanae patrocinium, omnem legem frangit14. Significantly, 
Lipsius notes that the maxim is taken from Seneca the Elder’s Declamationum 
Excerpta, lib. 9. However, it refers only to the first part of the sentence, which is 
in italics in Politicorum: Necessitas magnum humanae imbecillitatis patrocinium 
est. We could not find in Seneca’s work the part: Necessitas […] omnem legem 
frangit15. Taking into account the enormous influence of Lipsius’ Politicorum on 
the political elites of the Commonwealth and the rest of Europe, we could rightly 
assume that this work became the main source of knowing the discussed maxim 
at Fredro’s time. Characteristically, in Western Europe the principle of necessitas 
omnem legem frangit was inter alia invoked by one of the main doctrinaires of 
French absolutism – Cardin Le Bret. He claims that various circumstances demand 
different attitudes towards the law, including breaking the edicts for the sake of 
the public good16. Thus, at that time the principle was known and functioned in 
Europe in different types of government, which obviously affected its various 
understandings.
DEPARTURE FROM THE OLD LAW
In the activity and thought of Fredro the reference to the principle necessitas 
frangit legem served mainly to justify the departure from the old law. Thus, it con-
stituted de facto the key justification for legal change. We should note that the old 
13 On Fredro’s knowledge of Machiavelli’s Discourses see: M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Republika 
versus monarchia…, pp. 67–68.
14 J. Lipsius, Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction, transl. and ed. J. Waszink, Assen 
2004, p. 530, lib. 4, cap. 14. The Polish translation: J. Lipsius, Politica panskie, to iest Navka iako pan y 
kazdy przelozony rządnie zyć y sprawować sie ma: […], transl. P. Sczerbic, Kraków 1595, p. 136.
15 Seneca Rhetor, Suasoriæ, Controversiæ, et Declamationum excerpta, Amstelodami 1619, p. 182. 
Lipsius, as an editor of Senecas’ works, must have been aware of this fact. 
16 See C. Le Bret, De la Souveraineté du Roy, Paris 1632, p. 195; A Critical Dictionary of the 
French Revolution, eds. F. Furet, M. Ozouf, London 1989, p. 474. Considering that Le Bret, while 
referring to the discussed maxim, indicates Seneca’s authorship, it can be assumed that he knew the 
principle from Lipsius’ Politicorum.
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laws were highly respected in the Commonwealth17. Andrzej Maksymilian himself 
also appreciated them and was not eager to change them radically18.
Fredro encountered the principle of necessitas fragit legem in the public dis-
course at the beginning of his parliamentary career during the interregnum in 1648. 
The context of the discussion was marked by the rapid progress of the Cossack 
rebellion and the state of interregnum. The problem whether the law should succumb 
to necessity was then widely discussed at the election sejm19. Fredro especially 
supported the opinion of A. Kisiel, a Kiev voivode, who justified the legality of 
the departure from the parliamentary procedures by referring to the noble citizens’ 
will and the following principle:
Necessitas all in all fragit legem. Keeping the law, keeping formam Reipublicae, is a good thing, 
but in peacetime; currently by keeping the sejm’s solennitates, and by denying this [the right to act 
contrary to the procedures – M.T.T.] during the sejm or after the sejm, and interim to be left without 
defence, to die by keeping formam Reipublicae, means to lose the Commonwealth20.
Andrzej Maksymilian shared this argument by claiming inter alia: “It seems 
novitas to some of you, that after the sejm we are considering the defence: but 
they do not perceive these novitates, which occurred due to the enemies”21. Thus, 
characteristically, Fredro connected here novitas with necessitas. In this context, it 
17 On the approach to the old law during the debate during the election sejm in 1648, see M. Tracz
-Tryniecki, Wstęp, [in:] A.M. Fredro, Gestorum Populi Poloni sub Henrico Valesio, Polonorum 
postea vero Galliae Rege / Dzieje Narodu Polskiego za czasów Henryka Walezego, Króla Polaków, 
potem zaś Francji, transl. J. Macjon, introduction and footnotes M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Warszawa 2018, 
pp. 92–93. The radical opinions during this discussion rejected any changes of the law, demanding 
only its more effective execution. This conservative approach to the old laws is clearly visible in the 
following quote: “We need nothing new, being content with the old law, which we do not give up” 
(J. Michałowski, Jakuba Michałowskiego, wojskiego lubelskiego a później kasztelana bieckiego, 
Księga pamiętnicza, transl. L. Morsztyn, Kraków 1864, p. 313).
18 On the concept of the old law (leges antiquae) in Fredro’s thought, see M. Tracz-Tryniecki, 
Republika versus monarchia…, pp. 281–285.
19 On this discussion and the popularity of the opinion that the law should succumb to necessitas, 
see idem, Wstęp…, pp. 91–92. The superiority of necessitas was directly mentioned, inter alia, by 
B. Leszczyński: “[…] necessitas of the dying homeland frangit legem, thus in must parere necessitati” 
(J. Michałowski, op. cit., p. 244), or H. Radziejowski: “[…] lex necessitati should succumb, alias 
I am afraid, that on legibus fundata civitas pereat, because in this way in Roman monarchy extremum 
libertatis initium servitutis, brought” (Diariusz sejmu elekcyjnego 1648 roku, ed. J.S. Dąbrowski, 
Kraków 2013, p. 89). J. Choińska-Mika (Zwycięstwo liberum veto na sejmach za Jana Kazimierza 
(1648–1668), „Biblioteka Epoki Nowożytnej. Liberum Veto” 2016, vol. 4(1), p. 52, 56) notes, that 
even earlier, under the King Vladislav IV, the members of parliament were ready to evade legal norms, 
including the parliamentary procedures, which constrained them. Similarly, at the time of disasters, 
local sejmiks had more elastic approach to the letter of law.
20 J. Michałowski, op. cit., p. 355.
21 Ibidem, p. 356.





should be presumed that according to him necessitas are one of these new circum-
stances, which require a proper response – including a legal change.
Fredro’s attitude toward legal change is clearly expressed in his parliamentary 
speech at the sejm in 1654, when he responded deputies, who claimed that old 
good laws could not be changed but only their proper execution is required. His 
approach was articulated in the statement that the change in circumstances requires 
new regulations: Novi casus requirunt novas leges22. What convinces us that this 
quote was not just an element of contemporary political struggle but his consistent 
opinion is the fact that he developed this idea later in his political writing: The 
Support of Liberty (Pol. Poparcie wolności) in 1668: “New cases bring new laws 
and acts” – there is an old Latin and Polish proverb. No legislator is so deeply 
provident to envisage and earlier safeguard all possible cases23.
We could therefore presume that these novi casus, or new cases are treated by 
Fredro as a justification for legal changes. This approach is in turn in accordance 
with A. Kisiel’s opinion, which Andrzej Maksymilian had to have heard during 
the election sejm of 1648: casus faciunt leges24. One of the consequences of this 
conviction of the importance of a particular case for law-making is the necessity 
of discerning whether a given situation is so novel and unique, that it requires 
creating its specific pattern of the behaviour and thus to depart from the current 
regulations. It is therefore a kind of necessitas, which requires applying a virtue 
of prudence to discern and the virtue of justice to find a rule of action which is 
adequate to given circumstances.
Recognizing the soundness of changing the old law, Fredro indicates that it 
should be done by virtue of the will of the political nation. The will stays above the 
old law if the condition of neccessitas-novitas is fulfilled. Fredro especially stressed 
the supremacy of the national will in his speeches during the election sejm of 1648 
and the coronation sejm of 164925. Very characteristic is his statement made during 
the latter sejm, when he unsuccessfully defended himself from removal from the 
chamber of deputies during the procedure of rugi poselskie: “[…] in the situation 
when there is the law, the practice and custom withdraw. We have the law which 
22 See S. Ochmann-Staniszewska, Z. Staniszewski, Sejm Rzeczypospolitej za panowania Jana 
Kazimierza Wazy. Praca – doktryna – polityka, Wrocław 2000, vol. 1, p. 194 and vol. 2, p. 41–42.
23 A.M. Fredro, Poparcie wolności, [in:] Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania Jana Kazimie-
rza Wazy 1648–1668, vol. 3: 1665–1668, ed. S. Ochmann-Staniszewska, Wrocław 1991, p. 317. 
During the researches in 2019, it was found that Fredro is the author of this writing, which up to that 
moment had been known as anonymous. This finding was based on a manuscript of the most com-
plete version of this text at the Archiwum Prowincji Franciszkanów Reformatów in Kraków (no. 88, 
p. 115–128). This writing is currently being prepared for the publication.
24 See Diariusz sejmu elekcyjnego…, p. 71; J. Michałowski, op. cit., p. 256.
25 See Diariusz sejmu elekcyjnego…, pp. 47–48, 76, 87–88, 99–100, 143; J. Michałowski, op. cit., 
p. 272, 302.
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backs us up, because the whole Commonwealth, assembled during the election, 
agreed to hold a sejmik in Warsaw due to the fact that Wisznia was in danger”26.
Acknowledging the national right to adopt new laws and to change the old 
ones, Fredro cautions to not make this rapidly but moderately27.
The question of the self-reliance of the political nation during interregnum arose 
along with justifying the necessity of changing the old law. During the election 
sejm of 1648 two contradictory opinions, which recognized or denied the existence 
of this right, appeared28. Fredro definitely supported the latter. The nation during 
the period of interregnum is therefore entitled to make the decisions, which could 
departure from the existing legal order in order to adopt measures necessary to save 
the country29. At the verge of the next interregnum of 1668, he came back to this 
concept presenting it with more doctrinally mature justification in the above-men-
tioned writing The Support of Liberty30. According to him, the political nation, which 
temporally regains its self-reliance during an interregnum, is also entitled to make 
deeper constitutional corrections by changing the fundamental laws (fundamen-
talne prawa) and formam Status. Furthermore, the change of these fundamentals 
of political regime is impermissible during the reign of a king. Thus, for Fredro 
interregnum is a kind of constitutional moment, when the political nation should 
respond to the needs arising from the current constitutional experience with legal 
changes. In this case, the recognition of necessitatem refers to the assessment of 
the whole period of the reign of the previous king31.
FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO LAW
The principle necessitas frangit legem could be also found in the other man-
ifestations of Fredro’s flexible approach to law. It especially refers to flexible 
interpretation of the law, which he preferred. Characteristically, in Gestorum there 
is a critique of too detailed provisions of the Henrician Articles comparing with 
26 S. Ochmann, Sejm koronacyjny Jana Kazimierza w 1649 r., Wrocław 1985, pp. 87–89.
27 See A.M. Fredro, Scriptorum Seu Togae et Belli Notationum Fragmenta. Accesserunt Peristro-
mata Regum Symbolis expressa / Fragmenty pism, czyli uwagi o wojnie i pokoju. Zawierają dodatkowo 
Emblematy Królów w Rycinach, Symbolicznie Odtworzone, transl. J. Chmielewska, B. Bednarek, 
introduction and footnotes M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Warszawa 2014, p. 543; idem, Vir Consilii Monitis 
Ethicorum nec non Prudentiae civilis. Praeludente apparatus Oratorii Copia ad Civiliter dicendum 
instructus, Leopoli 1730, pp. 516–518, 251.
28 On the arguments of both groups, see M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Wstęp…, pp. 93–94.
29 Such extraordinary remedies were proposed by Fredro especially in 1648, during the rapid 
successes of Chmielnicki’s rebellion. See Diariusz sejmu elekcyjnego…, pp. 87–88, 99–100, 143; 
J. Michałowski, op. cit., p. 272, 302.
30 See A.M. Fredro, Poparcie wolności…, pp. 325–326.
31 In the Commonwealth it had, inter alia, a form of notified grawamina.





the previous regulations32. Fredro criticizes this solution, as it hinders flexible 
interpretation of the provisions and thus also flexible application of the law. Such 
a detailed approach in constitutional matters does not serve the question of free-
dom well. Perhaps the main source of this critique was the introduction of a six- 
-week session for each sejm, which, together with the later provisions of the act of 
163333, seriously hindered prolongation of sejms and thus their effective legislative 
capacity. Indeed, these restrictions caused a lot of trouble with achieving consent 
during sejms, which in turn led to their ineffectiveness34. This context enables bet-
ter understanding of Fredro’s motives, when he presumed that the effectiveness of 
republican institutions is a condition for the existence of political freedom.
It is also worthy to draw attention to the writing “Contraventio legibus quibus 
armatur et utuntur Poloni w izbie poselskiej na ścianie przylepione i znalezione” 
(which was found stuck on the wall of the chamber of deputies). Probably, Fredro 
was the author of this anonymous piece of work, which appeared during the sejm 
in winter 165235. It contained a sharp satire which mocked the casuistic and for-
malistic approach of the Poles to the law:
They keep the law, without which not only publica, but also private geruntur negotia, and even 
sine lege they do not take their seats, or do not let the way to one each others – until they kill each 
others. […] Why do they follow the law, but despise [the law] of God? […] A Pole goes to a church 
– in spite of officium he is equipped with the statutes, which he opens during the Mass and looks at 
them; in spite of “Our Father…” – he reads the law to God, he is said to want to remain under the 
law. […] And because absque lege nothing could happen during the current sejm, he [a Pole] wishes 
you [the deputies] to adopt novam legem: which regulates where a nobleman will go after death: to 
Heaven or hell?36
The Poles are therefore blamed that in stiffly keeping the letter of the law, they 
are deaf to the law of God with its equity. Consequently, such approach makes 
effective actions impossible, including resolving public problems. Indeed, the 
writing concerns the phenomenon of increasing legal rigor and formalism among 
deputies at that time, which is assessed as destructive to the functioning of the 
parliamentary system of the Commonwealth37. However, it must also be noted that 
32 See A.M. Fredro, Gestorum…, pp. 515–517. In the other works Fredro argues that the newly 
created legal provisions must be clear in their meaning. See idem, Vir consilii…, p. 347.
33 Volumina Legum, vol. 3, Petersburg 1859, p. 373.
34 See H. Olszewski, Sejm Rzeczypospolitej epoki oligarchii 1652–1763. Prawo – praktyka – 
teoria – programy, Poznań 1966, p. 316; E. Opaliński, Liberum veto, „Przegląd Polityczny” 2007, 
no. 81, p. 83; J. Choińska-Mika, op. cit., p. 51, 54.
35 On the possible authorship of Fredro, see M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Wstęp…, pp. 63–64.
36 Contraventio legibus armatur et utuntur Poloni, [in:] Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania 
Jana Kazimierza Wazy 1648–1668, vol. 1: 1648–1660, ed. S. Ochmann-Staniszewska, Wrocław 1989, 
pp. 97–98.
37 See J. Choińska-Mika, op. cit., p. 68.
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one of the aims of Contraventio legibus was to justify the procedural infringements 
committed during the political trial of H. Radziejowski, a deputy chancellor of the 
Crown, by referring to the necessity of the existence of an effective royal power.
Said flexibility is also visible in Fredro’s approach to the instructions given 
by sejmiks to their deputies (instrukcje sejmikowe). During the sejm of 1654, he 
argued that the strict adherence to the instructions would make it impossible to 
reach consensus. By presenting the proper model of the relation between a deputy 
and his sejmik, he states as follows: “Those who blindly keep their instructions 
do not know why they are in sejm. In the past, deputies did not receive written 
instruction, but fides, virtus, dexteritas, prudential were their viaticum. According 
to them, they settled everything during sejms”38.
Similarly, in the project of reform created at the end of “the deluge” (the North-
ern War of 1655–1660), titled: “A consideration necessary for quick and effec-
tive conclusions of sejms” (Pol. “Uważenie potrzebne do prędkiego zawierania 
sejmów”), which Fredro was most likely one of the authors of, there was a postulate 
to not reveal the matters of a forthcoming sejm39. It would preclude sejmiks to give 
instructions, which hinder free deliberations “according to conscience and for the 
public good” and “to conclude what expedit”40. It could be therefore clearly noticed 
that for Andrzej Maksymilian the deputies should first of all base their decisions on 
virtue – especially on prudence. This enables them in turn to recognize the common 
good according to a given situation and adopt adequate and just measures. The 
instructions become obstacles to this way of action41.
Fredro’s above-described flexible approach to the law, which manifests in the 
concepts of legal change and legal interpretation in his critique of both formalism 
and, indirectly, of the strict binding force of the instructions for deputies, have all 
one common denominator. This is the reference to the virtue of prudence combined 
with the orientation toward the aim of law, which is the common good. According 
to Andrzej Maksymilian, the law should first of all provide principles, which would 
be specified in details during their application depending on the need of a given 
situation. This leaves room for prudence, which should recognize which solution 
38 S. Ochmann-Staniszewska, Z. Staniszewski, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 195 and vol. 2, p. 39.
39 On the probable authorship of Fredro, see M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Republika versus monarchia…, 
p. 33.
40 See Uważenie potrzebne do prędkiego zawierania sejmów, [in:] Pisma polityczne…, vol. 1, 
p. 235.
41 It is worth to note, that a king was especially interested in lack binding force of the instruction. 
The researchers usually pay attention on generally lax attitude of deputies toward their instructions 
in the first period of the reign of King John II Casimir Vasa. The departure from the instruction was 
usually explained by the common consent. See E. Opaliński, Sejm srebrnego wieku 1587–1652. 
Między głosowaniem większościowym a liberum veto, Warszawa 2001, pp. 159–160.





would be a proper actualization of a principle in particular conditions42. This re-
quires paying special attention to the goal of a given institution and the intentions 
that the legislator had during its enactment (intentionem legislatoris)43. This mode of 
reasoning is especially visible in the way Fredro refers to precedents44. He carefully 
analyzes history to find precedents’ patterns and the reasons behind them. In this 
way, he aims to understand the motives (rationes) of those who created the norms45. 
He clearly describes this in the following quote: Res vero omnes, magis debent 
fieri a ratione, quam ab exemplo, imo exemplum, fundari debet super ratione, non 
ratio super exemplo46.
THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE RULE
Similar argumentation was used in the concept of exception to the law (exceptio-
nem legis), which was discussed by Fredro47. The construct of the exception is based 
on the premise of the rationality of a legislator, who pursues that which is beneficial 
and useful for the common good (utilitate communis boni). Hence, the different 
results of legal interpretation must be rejected as absurd. Andrzej Maksymilian is 
convinced that the general nature of the law does not make it possible to predict 
all possible future cases. The exception to the law therefore constitutes a solution, 
which is essentially put in the legal system. Thanks to the virtue of prudence it 
enables the elimination of legal interpretations, which results in situations contra-
dictory to the aim of the law. By basing the exception to the law on prudence and 
the aim of the law, which should also be the intention of a legislator, Fredro clearly 
refers to St. Thomas Aquinas. It is worth noting that Aquinas also refers to necessity 
when he discusses the principle of the exception to the law.
Fredro’s reference to necessitas in the context of W. Siciński’s veto during the 
winter sejm of 1652 had another nature. As a chairman of the chamber of deputies 
(marszałek izby poselskiej), he attempted to prevent the sejm from recognizing the 
validity of the protest of Siciński, a deputy from Upita48. In his dramatic address 
42 See M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Wstęp…, pp. 218–219.
43 See A.M. Fredro, Vir Consilii…, pp. 295–296; idem, Gestorum…, pp. 273–274.
44 The whole concept of Gestorum constitutes de facto a reference to precedent – the constitu-
tional moment of the Commonwealth during the Great Interregnums of the 16th century. See M. Tracz-
-Tryniecki, Wstęp…, pp. 25, 125–126, 211, 256–257. Fredro also in his parliamentary activity used 
the arguments, which referred to the previous precedents. See W. Czapliński, Dwa sejmy roku 1652, 
Wrocław 1955, p. 101.
45 See A.M. Fredro, Gestorum…, p. 19, 94.
46 Idem, Vir Consilii…, p. 287.
47 See ibidem, p. 296.
48 Fredro’s attitude toward Siciński’s veto is broadly discussed in: M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Andrzej 
Maksymilian Fredro na sejmie zwyczajnym 1652 r. – nowe spojrzenie, [in:] Na sejmikach i sejmach. 
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toward both united chambers in the evening on March 9, 1652, he stressed that as 
the consequence of the recognition of the veto the Motherland would be exposed 
to the greatest threat49. By doing this he acted and tried to persuade the members 
of the sejm to behave contrary to the principle which demanded respecting an in-
dividual protest. It must be noted that the opinion on the existence of this principle, 
which was a logical but radical consequence of unanimous consensus (unanimus 
consensus)50, had already been present in the public debate of the first half of the 
17th century51. Moreover, at the winter sejm in 1652 the conviction about the binding 
force of this principle was expressed inter alia by the leading politicians of the royal 
party52. However, Fredro rejected this rigid legalistic interpretation of unanimity 
and he followed the pragmatic concern for the good of the Commonwealth. The 
latter justified even non-application of the law which put her in danger. Hence, in 
the case of Siciński’s veto, Fredro attempted in the name of the necessity of saving 
the country to prevent the precedential use of the principle, which was deeply rooted 
in the debate and found logically, based on the existing political regime.
A CHANGE IN FREDRO’S APPROACH
Fredro’s above-described approach to the law and the principle of necessitas 
partially changed during the period of the political struggles over the royal project of 
the election vivente rege. He was in opposition to the king at that time. The change 
in Andrzej Maksymilian’s approach referred to the questions of the immutability 
of the old laws, the respect for the instructions given to deputies, the recognition 
Szlachta ziemi przemyskiej w życiu politycznym Rzeczypospolitej XVI–XVIII wieku, ed. D. Kupisz 
(in print).
49 See Recessus actorum comitialium in Anno 1652 Mense Januario, [in:] Akta miasta Gdańska – 
Recesy Stanów Prus Królewskich, Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku, sygn. APG: 300,29/136, k. 171r. 
See also: W. Czapliński, Dwa sejmy…, p. 122 and partially A. Kersten, Hieronim Radziejowski. 
Studium władzy i opozycji, Warszawa 1988, p. 308. It is worth to note that also earlier the necessity 
“to save the Motherland” served as a justification for the infringements of the law in the sejms, 
especially of parliamentary procedures. See S. Ochmann-Staniszewska, Z. Staniszewski, op. cit., 
vol. 2, pp. 225–226.
50 Later, in 1668, Fredro himself identified ius vetandi with the principle of the unanimous 
(or more literally “one common”) consent (zgoda jednopowszechna). See A.M. Fredro, Poparcie 
wolności…, p. 319.
51 In the debate there were both opinions: which supported pluralista votorum, and which 
recognized the binding force of a single deputy’s protest. See E. Opaliński, Sejm…, pp. 161–162; 
J. Choińska-Mika, op. cit., p. 52.
52 See especially the statement of D. Żytkiewicz of February 20, 1652. On March 11, 1652, 
after Siciński’s veto, this principle was explicite recognized by, inter alia, a deputy chancellor of 
the Crown (podkanclerzy koronny) S. Koryciński or a chancellor of Lithuania (kanclerz litewski) 
A.S. Radziwiłł. See W. Czapliński, Dwa sejmy…, p. 100; Recessus actorum comitialium…, k. 172v.





of liberum veto, the application of the article de non praestanda oboedientia, and 
the assessment of Radziejowski’s case53.
During the parliamentary struggles at the 1661 sejm, Fredro fiercely opposed, 
initially alone, any changes in the old laws: “I do prefer to stand up for the old 
laws, and I prefer to rather go astray without violating them, than to be wise by 
trampling them”54. He expressed the unwilling attitude toward the change of the 
old laws in his Scriptorum, published a year earlier55. Certainly, his main motive 
was the fact that in the Commonwealth the old laws were the basis of noblemen’s 
liberties56. While the proposed royal reforms intended to introduce an election 
during a reign of a king and changes in the mode of parliamentary procedures, 
which would practically limit citizen participation in the government, and would 
have certainly shrunk the scope of political freedoms57. The bond between freedom 
and the old laws is well-expressed in the advice, which Fredro gave to his sons: 
“At the sejms do not propose any changes, watch over the old laws and liberties, 
because the new ones will rather do more harm than improve”58. However, it must 
be noted that even in this approach the restraint from the changes of the old laws 
refers to the sejms during the reign of a king at the Commonwealth59. At the time 
of interregnum, as mentioned above, the political nation regains the ability to make 
fundamental legal changes60.
In the 1660s, Fredro unequivocally criticised the violations of law in the trial 
of Radziejowski. In his above-mentioned writing The Support of Liberty of 1668, 
he named the cases of both the former deputy chancellor and the later one of 
J.S. Lubomirski as examples of effective “entrapment” of freedom by the king61. 
53 The common character of this change was observed by the authors of the monograph of the 
sejms under King John Casimir: “This relatively lax earlier attitude toward the old and new laws 
changed during the sixties as the reaction to the strongly supported project of the election vivente 
rege of a French candidate. The nobility began to perceive threats even in every change of the old 
law, not to mention the introduction of the new one” (S. Ochmann-Staniszewska, Z. Staniszewski, 
op. cit., vol. 2, p. 42).
54 W. Kochowski, Historya panowania Jana Kazimierza z Klimakterów Wepazyana Kochow-
skiego, vol. 2, Poznań 1840, p. 120.
55 See A.M. Fredro, Scriptorum…, p. 543, 547.
56 See D. Malec, The nobility’s privileges and the formation of civil liberties in old Poland, [in:] 
Magna Carta: A Central European Perspective of Our Common Heritage of Freedom, eds. Z. Rau, 
P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, M. Tracz-Tryniecki, London – New York 2016, pp. 127–146.
57 See, i.a., the radical plan of reforms described by W. Czapliński (Próby reform państwa 
w czasie najazdu szwedzkiego, [in:] Polska w okresie drugiej wojny północnej 1655–1660, ed. A. Przy-
boś, vol. 1, Warszawa 1957, p. 325).
58 A.M. Fredro, Ojcowskie synom przestrogi, [in:] Ojcowskie synom przestrogi. Instrukcje 
rodzicielskie (XVI–XVII w.), eds. D. Żołądź-Strzelczyk, M. Kowalczyk, Wrocław 2017, p. 388.
59 See idem, Poparcie wolności…, pp. 323, 325–326.
60 See ibidem, pp. 325–326.
61 See ibidem, p. 317, 327.
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The experiences of both these trials prompted Fredro to formulate the postulate 
of a much more consistent separation of judicial power from the king, which was 
accompanied by a proposal to extend the jurisdiction of the Crown Tribunal62. This, 
in turn, led him to construct the justification of the division of power that was close 
to what was later created by Montesquieu.
In the discussed period we also see the change in Fredro’s approach toward the 
question of the infringement of the law by a king as the basis for the application of 
the article de non praestanda oboedientia. Although he always stressed the need 
of the law to be observed by those who govern, in Gestorum of 1652 he presented 
a forgiving attitude toward the errors of a king, especially toward unintentional 
infringements of norms63. Fredro also emphasized that disobeying procedure must 
be preceded by warnings given by a senate to a king. However, in Scriptorum pub-
lished in 1660 his approach to this issue was much more rigorous: “If he [a king] 
breaks or neglects any provision, he would lose the name of a king and become 
a tyrant to the law and the people, and a real liar”64.
As the instructions for the deputies are concerned, the change of Fredro’s ap-
proach is expressed in his support for strict adherence to them. In order to discipline 
deputies, he proposed that the assessment of their activity by sejmiks should be 
combined with the possibility of sejmiks deciding the penalty for the deputies who 
departure from their instructions. He argued in the following way: “The penalty 
on the wicked is needed, because without it much evil has been seen to be done 
contrary to the interdictions of the brother-citizens, and a reprimand alone without 
the punishment in a broken world and among a spoiled people could only help 
a little”65. Similarly, from the 1660s, Fredro expressed a different attitude to the 
liberum veto than in 165266. He began to defend the soundness of the institution of 
an individual contradiction, although he provided some serious restrictions of its 
62 Ibidem, p. 327. He expressed this view in his speech at the 2nd Sejm of 1666, when he postulated 
to transfer the jurisdiction of carmen lease maiestatis from a king to the Tribunal. See idem, Votum 
Seymowe, A.D. 1666. Post bellum Civile, [in:] F. Glinka, Zwierzyniec Iednorozcow. Z Przydatkiem 
Rożnych Mow, Seymowych, Listow, Pism y Dyskusow, tak Polskich, iako y Łacińskich, Lwów 1670, 
p. 193. The postulate of extending the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, which was expressed in The 
Support of Liberty, was notice by W. Bodnaruk, although without identifying its author. See W. Bod-
naruk, Trybunał Koronny. Szlachecki sąd najwyższy w latach 1578–1794, Lublin 2008, pp. 88–89.
63 See A.M. Fredro, Gestorum…, p. 467, 517; M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Wstęp…, pp. 223–224.
64 A.M. Fredro, Scriptorum…, p. 205.
65 Idem, Poparcie wolności…, p. 324.
66 See idem, Scriptorum…, pp. 436–451, 540–541; idem, Epistola ad Amicum, Zamość 1669 
(pages without pagination, printed pages no. 14–16); idem, Vir Consilii…, pp. 551–552. The change 
of Fredro’s attitude toward the law was characteristic to the nobility at the time of the disputes over 
the royal project of the election vivente rege. See S. Ochmann-Staniszewska, Z. Staniszewski, op. cit., 
vol. 2, pp. 41–44; A. Król, Sejmik ziem lwowskiej, przemyskiej i sanockiej w Sądowej Wiszni za pa-
nowania Wazów (1587–1668), Przemyśl 2018, p. 167.





use67. In the context of political disputes with the royal court both – maintaining 
the strict control of the political nation over its deputies and rigid observation of 
the laws constituting the constitutional guarantees, including ius vetandi – were to 
provide effective tools against the strength of royal power. Especially that during 
these struggles the king unfortunately used methods such as bribery, blackmail 
or threats68. The aim of this dispute was to maintain the free republican form of 
government and to protect the Commonwealth from imposing external dependency 
on Her in the person of a foreign candidate for the throne.
To close the analysis presented above of the change in Fredro’s approach it must 
be noted that later, during the period of the two next native kings, he again expressed 
a more flexible attitude toward the law. A few times he proposed major changes 
in the functioning of the state69. What remained unchanged in Fredro’s view was 
his sensitivity to the observation of laws guaranteeing free political government, 
including his emphasis on the division of power.
CONCLUSIONS
The principle necessitas frangit legem in Fredro’s thought primarily served to 
leave room for the virtue of prudence in the process of applying the law. This virtue 
demands to recognize what constitutes the common good in a given situation – 
thus, to look at the proper aim of the law. According to Fredro, due to the inherent 
natural limitations of the statutory law, prudence enables appropriate actions in 
unusual situations. Prudence enables an elastic approach to the law – to its change, 
interpretation or deviation from its norms in situations where obeying them would 
lead to a disaster. This also considers a laxer attitude toward the instructions given 
to the deputies. Fredro’s approach was motivated both by the responsibility for 
the state, which revealed the influence of the reason of state concept, and by the 
awareness that preserving freedom demands an efficient state operation. During 
the political struggles over the project of the election vivente rege, we notice the 
change in Andrzej Maksymilian’s attitude. The hardening of his approach to the 
law intended to strengthen the power of the institutional guarantees that preserve 
free government. This more legalistic approach to the law also resulted in greater 
67 See M. Tracz-Tryniecki, Wstęp…, pp. 35–39; Z. Ogonowski, Nad pismami Fredry. W obronie 
liberum veto, cz. 2, „Człowiek i Światopogląd” 1975, no. 5, pp. 100–103; S. Ochmann, Sejmy lat 
1661–1662. Przegrana batalia o reformę ustroju Rzeczypospolitej, Wrocław 1977, p. 31.
68 The dissemination of the opinion about the need to respect individual protests and the sejmiks’ 
instructions in the 1960s was noticed by J. Choińska-Mika (op. cit., p. 54).
69 His most important proposed changes referred to the introduction of tenure of office of the 
crucial offices in place of their lifelong holding and the election of a native king. See A.M. Fredro’s 
Epistola ad Amicum and the later Vir Consilii.
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constitutional sensitiveness and prompted Fredro to formulate a mature vision of 
the division of power.
Fredro’s case is a good example of the dilemmas of both political and legal 
thought and practice in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth70. They are even 
more obvious when we compare them with the situation in Western Europe, which 
is well expressed by M. Viroli’s description of Italy in the 16th century:
As structural changes in political order undermined the authority of medieval practices of “mixed 
constitutionalism”, scholars oriented their inquiries away from questions about the origins and legit-
imacy of government and towards effective methods with which rulers might maintain and enhance 
the power of the state. Instead of focusing on constitutional forms, these new studies addressed the 
art of governing71.
Andrzej Maksymilian attempted to reconcile these two problems in his works 
and actions. The prevalence of one of them in his reflection was determined by 
practical context of the Commonwealth political situation. At the same time, a de-
cisive role in keeping the balance between them was played by his approach to the 
principle necessitas frangit legem.
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STRESZCZENIE
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy stosunku Andrzeja Maksymiliana Fredry, jednego z kluczowych mę-
żów stanu i pisarzy politycznych siedemnastowiecznej Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, do zasady 
necessitas frangit legem. Na początku omówiono źródła intelektualne kształtujące jego rozumienie 
tej zasady. Wskazano na dwie grupy: związaną ze spojrzeniem chrześcijańskiej myśli prawniczej na 
necessitas oraz odnoszącą się do kwestii racji stanu. Analizie poddano cztery aspekty myśli i działal-
ności Fredry. Po pierwsze, wskazano na odwołanie do necessitas jako uzasadnienia zmiany starego 
prawa. Po drugie, przedstawiono różne przykłady elastycznego podejścia do prawa, wyrażające opinię 
Fredry o kluczowej roli roztropności w procesie stosowania prawa. Po trzecie, omówiono problem 
naruszenia prawa, odnosząc go do Fredrowskiej koncepcji wyjątku od prawa oraz do jego reakcji na 
weto Sicińskiego. Po czwarte, wskazano, jak Fredro – w kontekście konfliktu politycznego lat 60. 
XVII w. – przyjął znacznie bardziej sztywne stanowisko wobec przestrzegania prawa. W konklu-
zjach stwierdzono, że przypadek Fredry stanowi dobry przykład dylematów dotyczących sposobu 
połączenia skutecznego rządzenia z poszanowaniem form konstytucyjno-ustrojowych, przed jakim 
stanęła zarówno myśl polityczna, jak i praktyka Rzeczypospolitej.
Słowa kluczowe: Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro; Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów; necessitas 
frangit legem; prawo
Pobrane z czasopisma Studia Iuridica Lublinensia http://studiaiuridica.umcs.pl
Data: 27/10/2021 16:52:45
UM
CS
Po
we
re
d 
by
 T
CP
DF
 (w
ww
.tc
pd
f.o
rg
)
